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ABSTRACT
The Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG) system in urban China is 
functioned as the last resort safety net for poor people and plays 
a substantial role in poverty reduction. This paper provides new 
empirical insights into the MLG development across 31 regions in 
urban China between 2003 and 2013. In addition to widely used 
indicators like benefit levels and number of benefit recipients, we 
construct two indicators of MLG replacement rates to measure the 
generosity of the benefits relative to income from work. The results 
show that the development of the urban MLG system in China has 
followed different tracks before and after 2008. Since 2008, the 
governments have made great efforts to increase the generosity 
of the MLG system while put more stringent conditions on MLG 
beneficiaries. Moreover, since 2008, the generosity levels of the MLG 











The Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG, or Dibao) system in urban China provides a 
last income safety net for poor families’ sustenance.1 The aim of this benefit programme is to 
ensure minimum living standard for poor and vulnerable households (Chen and Barrientos 
2006). Provision of the benefits is based on need and is means-tested. In the presence of 
rising unemployment and inadequate social insurance benefits in China, the MLG scheme 
has received increasing attention as a safeguard against low income and poverty (Shang 
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and Wu 2004; Wu and Ramesh 2014). According to the ‘Twelfth Five-year Plan on the Civil 
Affairs Development’, the MLG standard was expected to be raised by 10% per year on 
average in urban areas of China and to reach 404.6 Chinese yuan (around 66.3 US dollars) 
per person per month at the end of the year 2015 (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China 2011). This goal has been completed ahead of schedule. By the end of the 
year 2014, the urban MLG standard reached 411 yuan (around 72.3 US dollars) per person 
per month (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2015).
A large set of literature focuses on the emergence and development of the MLG system 
in China (e.g. Jiang 2013; Leung 2003; Leung 2006; Leung and Wong 1999; Ngok 2010; 
Saunders and Shang 2001; Shang and Wu 2004). Another set of studies put more attention 
to the adequacy of the benefit scheme (e.g. Du and Park 2007; Gao, Garfinkel, and Zhai 
2009; Ravallion, Chen, and Wang 2006; Wang 2007). One general finding is that in spite 
of its rapid development and expansion, the MLG system is still far from effective in alle-
viating poverty (Gao and Zhai 2012; Ravallion, Chen, and Wang 2006). Nevertheless, the 
MLG system has played a substantial role in reducing poverty over the past few years (Wu 
and Ramesh 2014). The ineffectiveness of the system in alleviating poverty may come from 
two sources. First, the urban MLG system is distinguished from the rural MLG system. 
In urban areas, the MLG scheme is relatively generous and has become the major tool to 
help the urban poor out of poverty. However, the urban MLG system is targeted only at 
urban residents with their household registration (hukou) in the city of residence, whereas 
rural residents who have migrated to cities are excluded from the urban MLG system (Gao 
2010; Solinger 2005). The rural MLG system, on the other hand, is not formally established 
nationwide until 2007 and is not fully established in many districts (Gao and Zhai 2012). 
A number of eligible families in rural areas and the migrants from rural to urban areas, 
which are actually most vulnerable in terms of poverty, are not covered by the MLG system 
(Wang 2007).
Regional differences might also contribute to the ineffective MLG benefit system. In 
China, the administration and implementation of the MLG scheme is quite decentralised. 
Local governments are given the discretion to decide the MLG standards under which poor 
people can apply for the benefits. Meanwhile, they have considerable scope to enact their 
own rules of governing the finance (Chen and Barrientos 2006). Therefore, it is important to 
look at the regional difference to understand the development of the MLG system in urban 
China. However, so far empirical analyses are relatively rare that little is known about how 
the benefit schemes evolve across regions and how the cross regional variation has changed 
over time, especially in recent years. To make a contribution, this study aims to add empir-
ical insights into the development of the urban MLG programmes across 31 municipalities, 
provinces and autonomous regions over the period 2003 to 2013. As such, this study covers 
all regions ranging from the more developed eastern part to the less developed central and 
western part of China. The rural MLG system is not considered as the rural MLG system 
was not extended to the rural poor population nationwide until 2007.
Second, we use the year 2008 as the mid-point. After 2008, a series of MLG reforms 
were taken to increase the generosity of the benefits while specify the conditions to become 
eligible for the benefits. Splitting the period using the year 2008 also helps us to understand 
the impact of the global financial crisis on China’s MLG reforms. According to Liu (2009) 
and Zhang (2009), the global financial crisis caused an economic slowdown and a sharp 
fall in export growth in China, resulting in rising unemployment and social tensions and 
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instability. The crisis brought needs for urgent reforms on the social safety net to maintain 
social stability. To the best of our understanding, there is no research exploring the differ-
ent development paths before and after 2008. Moreover, we apply the relative convergence 
test (using the coefficient of variation) to analyse whether regional differences have been 
narrowed in recent years.
Third, in the comparative welfare state literature, indicators like total social expendi-
ture or programmatic expenditure have been widely used since they offer an alternative 
approach to measure the relative importance of the benefit programme (Castles 2009). More 
recently, Wang and Van Vliet (forthcoming) construct minimum income replacement rates 
for comparison across 33 European Union (EU) countries and non-EU OECD countries 
over 1990 to 2009. With replacement rates, social assistance and minimum income bene-
fits can be compared with other welfare programmes such as unemployment benefits. In 
addition, income replacement rates allow us to measure the generosity of the social benefits 
in relation to work income. However, regarding the MLG system in China, existing studies 
mainly rely on the MLG standards (e.g. Shang and Wu 2004; Wu and Ramesh 2014). Instead, 
indicators on MLG expenditure and MLG replacement rates are rarely applied. Therefore, 
in addition to MLG benefit levels and MLG recipients, this study constructs indicators on 
MLG expenditure and MLG replacement rate across all of the 31 urban regions in China, 
covering the period from 2003 to 2013. As such, this study contributes to the comparative 
welfare literature on social assistance and minimum income benefits. MLG replacement 
rates in China were quite low compared to the other developed countries in general. The 
highest ratio of the MLG standard to average wage was found in Tianjin for single persons, 
which was 11.7%. This was much lower than the more developed European countries, for 
instance, Luxembourg (45.1%, the highest in EU26) and a little bit higher than Estonia 
(11.0%, the lowest in EU26) (see Wang and Van Vliet 2014). All figures refer to the year 
2009 (for comparison).
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the institutional character-
istics of the Chinese urban MLG programmes. Section 3 describes the data and measures 
used in the study. Empirical statistics are presented in section 4. In section 5 we do some 
convergence and correlation tests. Section 6 concludes the paper.
MLG system in urban China
Welfare protection in China and the emergence of the urban MLG programme
The market-oriented economic reforms since 1978 have brought massive uncertainties and 
risks to urban workers. The growth number of low income families and unemployment 
constituted an imminent threat to social and political stability. By way of response, the 
Chinese government established a need-based and means-tested social assistance programme, 
referred to as the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG, or Dibao) programme, in cities. 
The objective of the MLG programme is to assist poor households in urban China, especially 
in the context of market-based structural reforms (Barrientos, Niño-Zarazúa, and Maitrot 
2010). The programme was first launched in Shanghai in 1993 for its urban registered 
residents. One of the goals was to provide protection to all eligible households and to assure 
full delivery of the benefits (Zhang 2012). Subsequently, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the 
central government department in charge of social assistance policy in China, encouraged 
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other cities to learn from Shanghai’s practice and promoted the rapid spread of the reform. 
The first regulatory framework of the MLG system was issued by the State Council in 1999. 
The ‘Regulations on Guaranteeing Urban Residents’ Minimum Living Standard’ regulated 
that ‘urban residents with non-agricultural household registration status, if the average 
income of their family members is below the minimum living standard of local urban 
residents, are entitled to material assistance from the local government for their basic life’ 
(State Council of the People’s Republic of China 1999). The 1999 Regulation legislates the 
rights of urban residents to social assistance. After several decades of development, the MLG 
system was expanded to cover all cities and towns in China by the end of the year 1999.
Since 2003, the number of MLG recipients has become stable, marking that the development 
of the MLG system entered a stage of consolidation. The administration of the MLG system has 
been improved. Many local governments have classified the MLG recipients and performed 
different management for different types of recipients. Other social assistance programmes 
such as medical, employment, education and housing have been extended. Consequently, a 
MLG-based social assistance system has been established in urban China (Ngok 2010).
A turning point came in 2008. Since then, a series of reforms have been imposed on 
China’s MLG system. For example, in October 2008, the Ministry of Civil Affairs released 
the ‘Way to Identify Urban Low Income Families’. In August 2010 the ‘Ministry of Civil 
Affairs Notification on Further Strengthening the Identification of Urban Dibao Target’ 
was published. In 2011, the Ministry of Civil Affairs released the ‘Guiding Comments on 
Further Specifying the Formulation and Adjustment Mechanisms of the Urban and Rural 
Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Standard’. These reforms aim to specify the conditions to 
become the MLG targets and strengthen the linkage between the MLG standard lines and 
people’s daily necessities and living cost (Zhong 2011).
Administration of the MLG programmes
The Ministry of Civil Affairs is in charge of the administration of the MLG programmes at 
the country level and acts as one of the key policymakers regarding the policy design and 
changes of the benefit policy (Zhang 2012). In practice, however, the benefits are actually 
given by local governments. Variations between municipalities are substantial. Each city has 
considerable scope to enact its own rules of governing the finance and determining the MLG 
standard lines (Chen and Barrientos 2006). In principle, local governments take the main 
responsibility for underwriting the programme. The central government takes on a share of 
the cost for local governments who cannot finance it (Solinger 2005). To apply for the MLG 
benefits, the head of the household should formally submit their application to the local 
street office, which is a neighbourhood-based agency of the district People’s Government, 
or the township government. The local street offices or the township governments assess 
the eligibility of the claimants at the preliminary stage. The county civil affairs department 
makes the final decision (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2012).
Eligibility conditions and activation requirements
The expansion of the MLG scheme in urban China since the 1990s can best be regarded 
as the policymaker’s response to fulfil the need for income support during the transition 
towards a market economy. Not only working-age people but also old-age people are covered 
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by the MLG system. In urban China, coverage of old age pensions is far from universal. The 
high financial burden of elderly dependents without pensions can lead households to fall 
into poverty (Saunders and Sun 2006). Theoretically, three types of targets are covered by 
the MLG programmes: the traditional ‘three nos’ (people who have no source of income, 
no working ability and no family); the unemployed on unemployment insurance or whose 
entitlement to unemployment insurance has expired with their average household income 
below the locally decided MLG standard line; or employees, lay-offs and retirees whose 
working income including living allowances and pensions are below the locally decided 
MLG standard line (Tang, Lin, and Ren 2003).
Based on the 1999 Regulation, there are two key determinants for entitlement to MLG 
benefits. The first eligibility concerns family formulation and residency status. Applicants 
of urban MLG benefits are required to be urban residents with their non-agricultural hukou 
in the city of residence. In this respect, the hukou system restricts welfare provision to 
households with urban registration status while rural residents who have migrated to cities 
are excluded from the MLG system. Although in some regions the hukou system has been 
reformed, the division between the rural and urban areas is still large.
Second, to be eligible for the MLG benefits, per capita family’s total income and assets 
ought to be below the local MLG standard line. The MLG standard line is computed in 
accordance with the minimum living standard, which is usually based on expenditure 
surveys of low income families and the financial capacity of the local government. The 1999 
and 2012 regulations stipulate that urban residents are eligible for the benefits when house-
hold per capita income from all sources is below the local MLG standard line (Ministry of 
Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2012; State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China 1999). Calculation of total household income sums up all monetary income and 
income in kind, including financial contributions from legally dependents and children.2 
Other factors, namely financial assets, employment status, health conditions and housing 
are also considered (Du and Park 2007).
The provision of MLG benefits is not subject to a time limit, as long as one needs them. 
In practice, only people who are disabled are provided with regular or long-term benefits. To 
maintain a work ethic, it is usually difficult for the able-bodied to receive MLG benefits, or 
they can receive only short-term benefits. Able-bodied recipients must register at employment 
agencies and participate in public community service activities (State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China 1999). In Shanghai, for example, able-bodied beneficiaries of the MLG 
programme must register at employment agencies and cannot refuse job offers without proper 
reason. Meanwhile, they must participate in vocational training provided by employment 
agencies. Those who are unemployed must take part in public community service activities. 
In cases of violation of these requirements, MLG beneficiaries may face an elimination or 
termination of the benefit eligibility (Huang et al. 2005). In some other cities, recipients who 
refuse job offers twice may not be entitled to the benefits (Shang and Wu 2004).
Determination of MLG benefit level
The MLG standard lines are set by local governments, under which people can apply for 
the benefits. The MLG standard lines are expressed as monthly amount in Chinese yuan. 
Several factors are taken into account for determining the MLG standard line: local per 
capita living standard; basic necessities to maintain a minimum living standard; the level 
160  J. WanG and Y. BaI
of economic development and financial capability of the local government; and the price 
index (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 1999). The MLG standard line should 
be lower than the minimum wage, unemployment benefits and pensions (Leung 2006). 
Since 2000 cities like Xiamen and Hangzhou started to set MLG standard lines on the basis 
of the number of members in the family (Cao 2007). Set at a subsistence level, the MLG 
benefit is a benefit package covering basic food, clothing, housing and appropriate electric 
power, water and gas cost as well as expenses on compulsory education if applicable (State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China 1999). In reality, it is the local government’s 
financial capacity that often restricts the determination of the MLG standard lines. In many 
less developed regions, the MLG standard lines are usually lower than what is needed to 
meet the households’ actual basic needs (Du and Park 2007). The MLG standard lines are 
adjusted in accordance with changes in consumer prices and the financial capability of the 
city government (Gao, Garfinkel, and Zhai 2009). What a family receives is the difference 
between the total MLG benefits eligible – local MLG standard line multiplied by the number 
of persons entitled within the household – and the total household income.
Data and method
Sample of regions and data years
In this paper, we track the development of urban MLG programmes across 31 municipali-
ties, provinces and autonomous regions. As such, we cover all urban areas from the eastern, 
central and western regions of China. We expect variations across regions since the eastern 
regions are more advanced in social and economic development while western regions are 
lagging behind. Rural MLG programmes are not included. Compared to the urban MLG 
programmes, rural MLG programmes are less developed and many districts have not fully 
established the scheme and therefore only a small fraction of poor people are covered (Deng 
and Wu 2006; Gao 2006). The empirical analyses are based on the period of 2003 to 2013. 
Various data sources are used, including the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2004–2014), National 
Bureau of Population and Employment Statistics Division (2004–2013), National Bureau 
of Statistics of China (2004–2014), and local government websites.
Expenditure on MLG programmes
To start with, we construct two indicators to measure MLG expenditure. First, we employ the 
indicator of social expenditure on urban MLG programmes as a share of local GDP. Second, 
the indicator of social expenditure on urban MLG programmes as a share of local public 
expenditure is used to assess the government expenditure preference for supporting the 
unemployed and poor. According to Castles (2009), the disaggregated programme expend-
iture offers an approach to measure the relative importance of the benefit programme. 
One-time or temporary social assistance benefits to cover unexpected and urgent needs or 
regular supplements to cover exceptional needs are not considered in the MLG packages.
MLG recipients
The coverage rate or take-up rate is of interest since it measures the extent to which indi-
viduals manage to receive social benefits for which they are actually eligible (Gao and Zhai 
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2012). Existing studies suggest that MLG eligible families often lack access to the benefits 
or are not willing to apply (Ravallion, Chan, and Wang 2006; Wang 2007). In this study 
we focus on the take-up rate since while the administrative databases may record benefit 
receipt accurately, they contain no information on non-recipients. Specifically, we measure 
the coverage of the urban MLG benefits in both absolute and relative terms: the number of 
urban MLG benefit recipients and the number of the recipients as a share of local non-ag-
ricultural population at the end of the year.3
Real MLG levels
The benefit level is relatively straightforward in measuring the generosity of social benefits, 
as it is just the amount of cash benefit (Olaskoaga, Alaez-Aller, and Diaz-De-Basurto-Uraga 
2013). We use two types of MLG benefit levels. First, MLG standard reflects the income 
line needed to meet the basic living standards. This indicator has the advantage that it is 
not affected by the mis-targeting problem which occurs when eligible households do not 
receive the benefits or ineligible households do receive benefits (Wang 2007). Usually the 
standard lines are adjusted according to changes in consumer prices and financial capability 
of the local governments. We take the MLG standard lines at the end of the year in case 
there might be adjustment within the year. Second, MLG expenditure per person implies 
the actual benefit levels spent by local governments on each recipient. This indicator reflects 
the gap between the standard MLG line and per capita household income of the recipient. 
In order to compare the benefit levels over time, all benefits are adjusted by inflation based 
on local urban consumer price index (CPI 2013=100).
MLG replacement rates
Minimum income replacement rate is a state-of-art indicator as it allows us to measure the 
generosity of the benefit relative to income from work. This indicator has been utilised for 
international comparisons across the European and non-EU OECD countries (Wang and 
Van Vliet forthcoming) but not for China. Following their practice, we first compute the 
replacement rate as a ratio of the MLG standard to average wage. The average wage is the 
average earnings of employment in urban work units. MLG benefit in comparison with 
the average wage enables us to indicate how the MLG benefits balance between need and 
incentive (Gustafsson and Deng 2011). In China, most MLG recipients are more likely to 
receive minimum wage instead of average wage since they are usually work dis-abled or 
low-skilled (Huang et al. 2005). Therefore, we also compute a MLG replacement rate as the 
ratio of MLG standard to minimum wage.
Development of MLG programmes in urban China over 2007 to 2013
Number of MLG recipients and its share in local urban non-agricultural population
Figure 1 depicts the nationwide trends in the number of MLG recipients and its percentage 
in non-agricultural population between 2003 and 2012. The number of the MLG recipients 
at the national level is the sum of the numbers of MLG recipients in all regions. Figure 1 
shows that the number of the MLG recipients reached the peak in 2009 and has declined 
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largely since then. On the other hand, the share of MLG recipients in relation to urban 
non-agricultural population has been decreasing over time. In 2010, the ‘Ministry of Civil 
Affairs Notification on Further Strengthening the Identification of Urban Dibao Target’ was 
issued. The notification not only defines the conditions for becoming MLG target but also 
regulates that those who do not meet the conditions should return what they have received. 
Since then, the number of urban MLG recipients has decreased significantly.
Trends in the MLG recipients across regions are presented in Table 1. The number of 
MLG recipients at the national level is the sum of the numbers of MLG recipients in all 
regions. For each group, the regions are ranked in order of the number of MLG recipients as 
a share of local non-agricultural population in 2012 (from smallest to largest). The number 
of MLG recipients varied significantly across regions. In particular, in the most developed 
regions, which are mainly in the east, there were far fewer people supported by the MLG 
programmes and the ratios of the recipients in total local non-agricultural population were 
much lower. The central part of China had the largest number of MLG recipients although 
they constituted a smaller percentage in local non-agricultural population compared to the 
west. One reason for the large cross-regional variation might be that in the less-developed 
central and western regions, people often do not have sufficient resources to meet their 
basic needs. And also, in the less-developed regions, social protection programmes like 
unemployment benefits and old-age pensions are less developed.
At the national level, the number of MLG recipients increased during the period 2003 
to 2008. The increase occurred mainly in the west. In fact, in the eastern and central part of 
China, the number of the MLG recipients decreased both before and after 2008. Even the 
west has observed a decrease in the number of the MLG recipients since 2008. Finally, all 
regions witnessed decreases in the MLG recipients in terms of total local non-agricultural 
population over time.
MLG expenditure as a share of local GDP and local public expenditure
Figure 2 shows the indicators of MLG expenditure as a share of local GDP and local public 
expenditure across 31 regions in 2013 grouped into three regions: eastern, central and 
western regions. Variation in MLG expenditure was significant across regions. Low ratios 
are mainly found in eastern regions, including Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, Beijing, and 
Figure 1. Trends in the number of MlG recipients and its share of non-agricultural population in China, 
2003–2012. Source: China Civil affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2004–2013, China Population & Employment 
Statistical Yearbook 2004–2013 and own calculations.
note: Data for non-agricultural population is not available for the year 2013.
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Jiangsu. High ratios are found in Jilin, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Gansu. 
On average, the east had the lowest MLG expenditure while the central had the highest. 
One reason for the lower ratios in the eastern regions could be that these regions often have 
higher GDP and higher public expenditure than the central and the west – the denominator 
effect. Overall, MLG expenditure was rather low in 2013. Gansu province had the highest 
MLG expenditure ratio relative to local GDP, which was lower than 0.5%. Regarding MLG 
expenditure as a share of local public expenditure, the highest ratio appeared in Heilongjiang 
province, which was around 1.5%.
Figure 3 depicts the trends in MLG expenditure across the eastern, central and western 
regions for 2005, 2008 and 2013. The left-hand bars show changes in MLG expenditure 
as a share of local GDP while the right-hand bars show changes in MLG expenditure as a 
Table 1. Trends in the number of MlG recipients and its share of local non-agricultural population across 
regions, 2003–2012.
note: Data for non-agricultural population is not available for the year 2013.
Source: China Civil affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2004–2013, China Population & Employment Statistical Yearbook 2004–2013 
and own calculations.
number of MLG recipients (million)
MLG recipients as a share of non-agricultural 
population (%)
2003 2008 2012 2003 2008 2012
national 22.47 23.35 21.44 6.0% 5.3% 4.5%
East
Zhejiang 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.7% 0.7% 0.5%
Guangdong 0.35 0.40 0.37 1.0% 0.9% 0.8%
Jiangsu 0.34 0.46 0.37 1.2% 1.3% 0.9%
Beijing 0.16 0.15 0.11 1.9% 1.5% 1.1%
Shandong 0.72 0.61 0.53 2.5% 1.7% 1.3%
fujian 0.19 0.20 0.17 1.9% 1.7% 1.4%
Shanghai 0.45 0.34 0.22 4.3% 2.8% 1.7%
Tianjin 0.24 0.16 0.17 4.4% 2.7% 2.7%
hebei 0.82 0.94 0.77 4.5% 4.2% 3.3%
hainan 0.13 0.18 0.16 6.2% 5.3% 4.6%
liaoning 1.60 1.37 1.07 8.1% 6.5% 4.9%
Central
anhui 1.04 0.99 0.82 7.9% 6.6% 5.2%
hainan 1.26 1.46 1.33 6.5% 6.4% 5.5%
hubei 1.66 1.44 1.30 9.4% 6.1% 6.1%
Jilin 1.46 1.28 0.91 12.2% 10.4% 7.1%
Shanxi 0.84 0.92 0.89 8.9% 8.3% 7.6%
Jiangxi 1.01 0.95 0.98 9.4% 7.6% 7.6%
heilongjiang 1.58 1.53 1.52 9.0% 8.3% 8.2%
hunan 1.43 1.45 1.46 10.2% 9.3% 9.2%
West
Chongqing 0.70 0.79 0.52 9.3% 8.7% 3.9%
Guangxi 0.60 0.57 0.52 6.7% 5.9% 5.0%
Shaanxi 0.79 0.84 0.75 8.8% 7.9% 5.1%
ningxia 0.24 0.21 0.18 12.2% 9.0% 7.0%
Sichuan 1.46 1.86 1.86 8.2% 8.4% 7.3%
Guizhou 0.43 0.55 0.53 7.2% 8.4% 7.7%
inner Mongolia 0.70 0.85 0.81 8.1% 8.6% 8.0%
Yunnan 0.64 0.86 0.94 9.4% 11.6% 9.0%
Tibet 0.04 0.04 0.05 10.1% 7.5% 9.1%
Xinjiang 0.72 0.76 0.96 10.4% 8.5% 10.0%
Qinghai 0.20 0.22 0.23 14.1% 13.7% 11.3%
Gansu 0.57 0.90 0.88 10.0% 13.4% 11.9%
Mean-East 0.46 0.44 0.37 3.3% 2.7% 2.1%
Mean-Central 1.29 1.25 1.15 9.2% 7.9% 7.1%
Mean-West 0.59 0.70 0.68 9.5% 9.3% 7.9%
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share of local public expenditure for the three regions. On average, MLG expenditure as a 
share of local GDP remained stable in the three regions between 2005 and 2013. However, 
opposite trends could be found before and after 2008. Since 2008, MLG expenditure as 
Figure 2. MlG expenditure as a share of local GDP and local public expenditure, 2013. Source: China Civil 
affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014 (Ministry of Civil affairs of the People’s republic of China 2014), national 
Bureau of Statistics of China (http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=hgjd/) and own calculations.
Figure 3. Trends in MlG expenditure as a share of local GDP and local public expenditure, 2005–2013. 
Source: China Civil affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2006–2014, national Bureau of Statistics of China (http://
data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=hgjd/) and own calculations.
note: Data of MlG expenditure are not available for the years 2003 and 2004.
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a share of local GDP has decreased in all regions. With respect to MLG expenditure as 
a share of local public expenditure, decreases could be observed in all regions between 
2005 and 2013. The decreases mainly occurred after 2008. In early November 2008, China 
announced a massive fiscal stimulus package of RMB 4tn (around 586 billion US dollars) 
to offset the sharp decline in external demand due to the global recession. As most of the 
funding responsibility would be covered by local governments and institutes, local public 
expenditure increased dramatically. However, a large part of the local public expenditure 
was allocated to public investment to promote economic growth, such as transportation 
network, rural infrastructure, and the Sichuan post-earthquake reconstruction (Liu 2009). 
Instead, social welfare expenditure decreased relatively in terms of local public expenditure. 
Detailed information for the trends in MLG expenditure as a share of local GDP and as a 
share of local public expenditure for the 31 regions are presented in Appendix 1.
Real MLG standard and real MLG expenditure per person (monthly)
Figure 4 shows the real monthly MLG standards and real monthly MLG expenditure per 
person by local governments in 2013. The benefit levels are expressed in real values adjusted 
by local urban CPI (local urban CPI 2013 = 100). MLG expenditure per person reflects the 
difference between the MLG standard and per capita household income for the recipient. 
The real benefit levels varied substantially across regions. Regions in the east got higher MLG 
standards and real MLG expenditure per person than regions in the centre and west. The 
highest benefit levels are found in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. There is 
no big difference between the centre and west. The large gap between the east and the other 
two groups of regions may be explained partly by the fact that in the more developed eastern 
regions, consumer prices and living standards to which the MLG benefits are indexed are 
much higher. Meanwhile, the economic situation of local governments in eastern regions 
is usually better than that in the centre and west, therefore they can provide more generous 
benefits. High MLG standards are usually associated with high MLG expenditure per person. 
However, there are some exceptions. For instance, Beijing had a lower real MLG standard 
than Tianjin in 2013 but its MLG expenditure per person was much higher than the latter. 
Overall, the MLG standards and MLG expenditure per person are quite low in China. In 
2013, the national MLG standard was only 391.2 yuan (around 63 US dollars) and the 
national MLG expenditure per person was 289.8 yuan (around 46.7 US dollars) per month.
Turning to the trend, we can see that between 2003 and 2013, the MLG standards and 
real MLG expenditure per person increased in all regions (see Figure 5). This suggests that 
the benefit levels increased more than the consumer prices. Moreover, the east experienced 
larger increases in the two indicators than the centre and the west over the period of 2003 
to 2013. Noticeably, the large increase in MLG standard took place mainly after 2008. This 
is conceivable since the MLG reforms after 2008 have highlighted the goal to improve the 
adequacy of the MLG benefits. Another reason for the increasing MLG benefit levels may 
be that since around 2008, the economic slowdown and the fall in export growth intensified 
China’s unemployment problems, causing social tensions and instability. As a result, local 
governments began to take initiatives for more generous welfare protection programmes 
to maintain social stability (Liu 2009). Further information of the trends in real monthly 
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MLG standard and real monthly MLG, expenditure per person across the 31 regions can 
be found in Appendix 2.
Figure 4. real monthly MlG standard and real monthly MlG expenditure per person, 2013. Source: China 
Civil affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014, national Bureau of Statistics of China (http://data.stats.gov.cn/
workspace/index?m=hgjd/) and own calculations.
note: The national MlG standard and national real MlG expenditure are the simple averages of the 31 regions.
Figure 5. Trends in real monthly MlG standard and MlG expenditure per person, 2003–2013. Source: 
China Civil affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014, national Bureau of Statistics of China (http://data.stats.gov.
cn/workspace/index?m=hgjd/) and own calculations.
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Generosity of the MLG standard relative to poverty lines
Among the low-income countries, a commonly used poverty measure is 1.25 or 1.5 US 
dollars per person per day. Despite its wide use, this measure has two limitations. First, its 
application is limited when the price varies across different regions and over different time 
periods within a country. Second, this poverty measure is adjusted in accordance with the 
purchasing power parity (PPP), which fails to reflect the local cost of living. To overcome 
these limitations, Meng et al. (2005) use the ‘cost-of-basic-needs’ method to estimate the 
urban food, lower and upper poverty lines for 29 regions from 1986 to 2000 in China. 
The lower (upper) poverty line is defined as the food poverty line plus the necessary (plus 
other unnecessary) non-food consumption (Meng, Gregory, and Wang 2005). Following 
Wang’s (2007) approach, we use the food, lower and upper poverty lines of 2000 by Meng, 
Gregory, and Wang (2005) and local urban CPI to estimate the poverty line for the period 
2001 to 2013.4
In Table 2 we present the local MLG standards and our estimated food, lower and upper 
poverty lines for the 29 regions in 2013. Almost in all regions the MLG standards were 
higher than the three types of poverty lines. Guangdong province was the only exception 
which set a lower MLG standard than the upper poverty line.
Table 2. MlG standard and estimated food, lower and upper poverty line in 29 regions, 2013.









poverty line difference difference difference
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1)/(2)-1 (1)/(3)-1 (1)/(4)-1
Beijing 580.0 221.31 295.22 374.27 1.62 0.96 0.55
Tianjin 600.0 180.71 245.31 309.9 2.32 1.45 0.94
hebei 378.5 125.33 171.35 221.39 2.02 1.21 0.71
Shanxi 351.1 101.11 143.25 193.19 2.47 1.45 0.82
inner Mongolia 460.3 105.99 146.85 195.35 3.34 2.13 1.36
liaoning 411.5 120.57 168.1 217.26 2.41 1.45 0.89
Jilin 322.5 105.35 147.69 194.35 2.06 1.18 0.66
heilongjiang 387.7 107.13 148.06 191.82 2.62 1.62 1.02
Shanghai 640.0 262.23 341.31 409.63 1.44 0.88 0.56
Jiangsu 485.1 148.23 194.38 233.77 2.27 1.50 1.08
Zhejiang 515.5 184.11 244.44 300.93 1.80 1.11 0.71
anhui 380.5 123.89 162.75 194.84 2.07 1.34 0.95
fujian 363.3 161.48 226.07 284.21 1.25 0.61 0.28
Jiangxi 395.7 122.85 165.83 210.49 2.22 1.39 0.88
Shandong 417.7 147.26 215.33 306.49 1.84 0.94 0.36
henan 309.2 113.75 162.04 219.8 1.72 0.91 0.41
hubei 375.1 150.95 203.67 258.49 1.48 0.84 0.45
hunan 356.1 130.25 171.78 211.93 1.73 1.07 0.68
Guangdong 380.4 240.84 316.07 383.93 0.58 0.20 −0.01
Guangxi 334.7 168.7 218.42 264.98 0.98 0.53 0.26
hainan 353.3 162.85 211.45 252.52 1.17 0.67 0.40
Sichuan 306.4 137.19 180.88 219.65 1.23 0.69 0.39
Guizhou 347.6 134.52 175.4 212.23 1.58 0.98 0.64
Yunnan 323.9 158.17 207.64 255.82 1.05 0.56 0.27
Shaanxi 374.7 120.41 169.3 226.78 2.11 1.21 0.65
Gansu 279.0 141.24 191.43 246.04 0.98 0.46 0.13
Qinghai 330.8 136.68 185.62 236.81 1.42 0.78 0.40
ningxia 287.6 127.67 185.94 261.1 1.25 0.55 0.10
Xinjiang 300.4 126.03 169.88 217.63 1.38 0.77 0.38
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Generosity of the MLG standard relative to labour income – measured by MLG 
replacement rates
Although the MLG standards are set higher than the poverty lines in China, the generosity of the 
benefits in relation to work income, measured by the MLG standard as a share of average wage 
or minimum wage (see Figure 6). At the national level, the MLG standard as a share of average 
wage was 9.4% while the MLG standard as a share of minimum wage reached 30.2% in 2013. The 
low ratio of the MLG standard to local minimum wage may reflect the relationship between the 
three-tier basic income support in China: minimum wage > unemployment insurance > MLG 
standard (Sunders and Shang 2001). Unemployment insurance is usually linked to minimum 
wage, which varies between 70–80% of minimum wage (Leung 2003). The share of the MLG 
standard in minimum wage is even lower. Moreover, the MLG benefit in China usually does not 
account for rental cost as the recipients usually have their own dwellings or live in subsidised 
public housing (Leung and Wong 1999). Minimum wage, on the other hand, is closely linked 
to local average wage, productivity, unemployment level, economic development and minimum 
living expenses, and is especially focused on rural migrants (Wang and Gunderson 2011).
Table 3 presents the trends in the two types of replacement rates across regions for 
2003, 2008 and 2013. For each group regions are ranked in order of the MLG standard as 
Figure 6. MlG standard as a share of local average wage and as a share of local minimum wage, 2013. 
Source: China Civil affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014, China Statistical Yearbook 2014 and local government 
websites.
note: The national replacement rates are the simple averages of the 31 regions.
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a share of minimum wage in 2013 (from smallest to largest). Except for Tibet, all regions 
have seen decreases in both types of replacement rates. On average, the west has seen the 
largest decrease in the ratio of MLG standard as a percentage of minimum wages while the 
east has observed the largest decrease in the share of MLG standard in average wage. The 
decreases were mainly seen before 2008. Unlike the east, the centre and west have actually 
gone through increases in MLG standard as a share of average wage after 2008. This is mainly 
caused by the large increases in MLG standards since 2008. Similarly, although decreases 
in the ratio of MLG standard relative to minimum wage could be observed in all regions 
both before and after 2008, the decreases were much smaller and many regions actually 
increased their MLG generosity in relation to minimum wage after 2008.
Table 3. Trends in MlG standard as a share of average wage and as a share of minimum wage, 2003–
2013.
note: The national replacement rates are the simple averages of the 31 regions.
Source: China Civil affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2004–2014; China Statistical Yearbook 2004–2014; Ministry of human re-
sources and Social Security of the People’s republic of China; local human resources and Social Security Bureaus; Chinese 
Public information online, and local government websites.
  MLG standard as a share of average wage (%) MLG standard as a share of minimum wage (%)
  2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013
East          
Guangdong 12.3 9.2 8.6 40.4 29.8 24.5 
fujian 14.4 9.9 9.0 35.8 28.1 27.5 
hebei 17.0 9.7 10.9 44.9 28.8 28.7 
Shandong 15.5 10.7 10.7 39.5 30.9 30.3 
hainan 16.7 10.4 9.4 32.2 30.0 31.5 
liaoning 16.3 9.9 10.9 48.6 32.0 31.7 
Jiangsu 14.4 10.7 10.2 34.8 32.7 32.8 
Zhejiang 12.1 10.6 10.9 41.0 30.9 35.1 
Shanghai 13.6 9.2 8.4 50.9 41.7 39.5 
Tianjin 15.6 12.0 10.6 50.2 48.8 40.0 
Beijing 13.9 8.4 7.5 58.6 48.8 41.4 
Central            
Jilin 14.1 8.3 9.0 36.1 24.9 24.4 
henan 14.1 8.3 9.7 32.9 26.0 24.9 
Shanxi 14.0 9.4 9.1 36.5 27.8 27.2 
hunan 13.8 9.0 10.0 34.5 27.1 28.2 
hubei 15.5 10.1 10.3 34.3 26.8 28.9 
anhui 17.9 9.9 9.6 41.9 37.9 30.2 
Jiangxi 12.9 11.3 11.2 44.8 33.3 32.2 
heilongjiang 16.7 11.1 11.4 38.5 29.5 33.4 
West            
Xinjiang 11.8 7.0 7.3 28.3 17.9 19.8 
ningxia 14.3 7.5 6.8 43.7 33.4 22.1 
Gansu 12.7 8.0 7.8 45.7 25.4 23.3 
Sichuan 13.1 9.2 7.7 39.7 32.8 25.5 
Yunnan 14.4 10.2 9.2 42.2 29.1 25.6 
Guangxi 14.1 8.6 9.7 40.0 26.6 27.9 
Qinghai 12.1 7.5 7.7 58.5 31.4 30.9 
Shaanxi 14.4 8.1 9.5 42.2 28.7 32.6 
Chongqing 14.3 10.4 8.3 46.3 34.0 33.0 
Guizhou 12.1 7.9 8.8 31.1 24.4 33.7 
inner Mongolia 13.6 9.0 10.9 38.5 28.7 34.1 
Tibet 8.6 7.0 9.0 . 35.0 36.0 
Mean-national 14.1 9.3 9.4 41.1 31.1 30.2 
Mean-East 14.7 10.1 9.7 43.4 34.8 33.0 
Mean-Central 14.9 9.7 10.0 37.4 29.2 28.7 
Mean-West 13.0 8.4 8.6 41.5 28.9 28.7 
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Convergence and correlation tests
Convergence test
The descriptive analyses above suggest that the development of the MLG programmes has 
followed different paths before and after 2008 in urban China. Since 2008, the governments 
have made great efforts to increase the generosity of the MLG schemes while putting more 
stringent conditions on MLG beneficiaries. Consequently, the MLG standards increased 
significantly while the number of MLG recipients decreased enormously. However, the 
development of MLG programmes varies considerably across regions. Thus the question 
rises as to how the dispersion across regions has changed over time. To answer this question, 
this study applies the relative convergence (divergence) test using the so-called coefficient of 
variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean value of the corresponding 
data. A drop (rise) in the coefficient of variation suggest a convergence (divergence) across 
regions (Caminada, Goudswaard, and van Vliet 2010).
Table 4 shows the changes in the coefficient of variation for real monthly MLG stand-
ard, real monthly MLG expenditure per person, MLG standard as a share of average wage 
and MLG standard as a share of minimum wage between 2003 and 2013. The two sets of 
indicators indicate the absolute amount of the benefits and the relative generosity of the 
benefits to labour income. We test the convergence (divergence) by using data from all 
regions. Between 2003 and 2013, the coefficient of variation decreased for the indicators 
of real MLG standard, real MLG expenditure per person, and MLG standard as a share of 
minimum wage. The decrease mainly occurred after 2008. Although the coefficient of var-
iation for the MLG standard as a share of average wage increased before 2008, it has been 
decreasing after that. Overall, China has observed decline in the coefficient of variation 
for all indicators after 2008, implying a convergence of the generosity levels of the MLG 
programmes across regions since 2008.
Correlation test
In Table 5, we report the correlations between MLG expenditure, MLG recipients and the 
benefit levels. The indicator of MLG replacement rate is not included since it is intrinsically 
determined by the benefit level as well as work income. We use time-series-cross-sectional 
data analysis based on the data from all regions over the period 2003 to 2013. As expected, 
MLG expenditure is highly and positively associated with the number of MLG recipients. 
Interestingly, the relationship between MLG expenditure and MLG benefit level is strongly 
negative. On the one hand, the drastic reduction in MLG recipients could help to decrease 
the MLG expenditure. On the other hand, after 2008 local public expenditure grew signifi-
cantly. However, a large part of the public expenditure increase went to areas which helped 
Table 4. Convergence test for the development of MlG programmes in China using the coefficient of 
variation, 2003–2013.







real monthly MlG standard 0.256 0.304 0.231 0.048 −0.073 −0.026
real monthly MlG expenditure per person 0.413 0.315 0.280 −0.098 −0.035 −0.132
MlG standard as a share of minimum wage 0.179 0.207 0.173 0.028 −0.034 −0.006
MlG standard as a share of average wage 0.131 0.140 0.135 0.009 −0.005 0.004
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to promote the economic growth. On contrary, the relative share of MLG expenditure in 
local public expenditure decreased.
Discussion and conclusion
Over the past few years, the MLG system in urban China has been largely reformed, espe-
cially since 2008. On the one hand, the governments performed the reforms to strengthen 
the role of the urban MLG system as the last resort safety net for poor people. On the other 
hand, MLG reforms are needed in the presence of the global financial crisis. The economic 
slowdown and fall in external demand due to the global recession led to increasing unem-
ployment and social instability, in reaction to which the local governments began to take 
initiatives for more generous MLG benefits (Liu 2009). However, so far little is known 
about the impact of the reforms on the MLG development. Moreover, little attention has 
been paid to the regional differences. This is remarkable given that the administration of 
the urban MLG programmes is actually decentralised. Therefore, this paper engages on 
the development of the urban MLG programmes in the 31 provinces, municipalities and 
autonomous regions over 2003 to 2013, thus covering all regions from the eastern, central 
and western part of China.
The results show that the development of China’s urban MLG system varies considerably 
across regions over 2003 to 2013. In the more developed eastern regions, the numbers of 
the benefit recipients are very low. The governments manage to raise the benefit levels albeit 
with low MLG expenditure. On the contrary, in the less developed central and western 
regions with limited financial resources, since the benefit recipients are in large numbers, 
even high MLG expenditure could only maintain low benefit levels. However, differences 
in the generosity of the benefits expressed by MLG standard as a ratio of average wage and 
as a ratio of minimum wage across regions are not significant. Nevertheless, although the 
dispersion of the MLG development across regions is still large, the generosity levels of the 
MLG programmes have been converging across regions since 2008.
The development of the urban MLG system seems to follow a different path after 2008. 
Since then, the number of MLG recipients has decreased significantly. Hence, the govern-
ments manage to increase the real benefit levels and increase the generosity of the benefits. 
The generosity of the benefit levels has been improving. In 2013 most regions actually had 
MLG standards higher than the poverty lines, implying that MLG benefits were adequate 
for poor people’s survival. However, the generosity of the benefits relative to work income 
is quite low. In an era when economic development has increased the income of most 
labour, it would be demanding to construct an income redistribution mechanism to assist 
those who are underprivileged. Overall, China’s MLG policy is still in its early stages. The 
curtained social expenditure on MLG programmes may hamper its role in promoting social 
development. To improve the adequacy and efficiency of the MLG programmes, one urgent 
problem is to specify the division of the tasks between the central and local governments. 
Local governments with a better situation in fiscal resources may increase their MLG stand-
ards in the presence of declining MLG recipients. For the local governments who cannot 
afford it, the role of the central government in MLG financing could be reinforced.
Moreover, the urban MLG is based on household registration status (hukou). Currently, 
there are a huge number of rural migrants entering the cities. Due to the lack of local hukou, 
they are blocked from the protection of local MLG programmes. The social rights of the 
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floating migrants for basic needs are usually neglected by hosting governments. Further 
reforms may be of importance to eliminate the segregation between urban and rural areas 
and between the public and non-public sectors. After all, the MLG system has become an 
important supplement to China’s employment-based social insurance system and essential 
to maintain social stability. Finally, this paper focuses on the MLG programmes in urban 
China. It might be interesting for future research to explore the development of rural MLG 
programmes and its impact on poverty alleviation in China.
Notes
1.  We follow Solinger and Hu (2012) to name the Dibao system as the ‘Minimum Livelihood 
Guarantee’ system. Different authors use different names (see Gao 2006; Leung and Wong 
1999).
2.  According to the Chinese Marriage Law, relatives are responsible to support other members 
in the household, including husband and wife, parents and children under 18 or still in 
education, grandparents and grandchildren if the parents of the children have passed away, 
adult children and their parents or grandparents, adult brothers or sisters to their siblings 
who are disabled or below 18 years old or in school, if their parents have passed away or 
cannot support their siblings.
3.  In China, applicants of urban MLG benefits need to have urban hukou with local non-
agricultural household registration status.
4.  Many scholars use the ‘cost-of-basic-needs’ method to estimate the poverty line for each region 
using cross section data for one year, and then use CPI to adjust the poverty line through 
time: see e.g. Ravallion and Chen 2007.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
Barrientos, A., M. Niño-Zarazúa, and M. Maitrot. 2010. “Social Assistance in Developing Countries 
Database Version 5.0.” Chronic Poverty Research Centre. http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/
publication_files/social-assistance-database-version-5.pdf
Cao, Y. 2007. “Woguo chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang biaozhun de yingxiang yinsu yu 
xiaoying yanjiu [Analysis of the Determinants and Effects of the Chinese Minimum Livelihood 
Guarantee Standard].” Dangdai jingji kexue [Modern Economic Science] 29 (2): 15–20.
Caminada, K., K. Goudswaard, and O. van Vliet. 2010. “Patterns of Welfare State Indicators in the EU: 
Is There Convergence?” Journal of Common Market Studies 48 (3): 529–556. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
5965.2010.02063.x.
Castles, F. G. 2009. “What Welfare States Do: A Disaggregated Expenditure Approach.” Journal of 
Social Policy 38 (1): 45–62. doi:10.1017/S0047279408002547.
Chen, J., and A. Barrientos. 2006. “Extending Social Assistance in China: Lessons from the Minimum 
Living Standard Scheme.” Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Paper 67. http://www.
chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/WP67_Chen_Barrientos.pdf
Deng, D., and X. Wu. 2006. “Wanshan nongcun jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu de ruogan 
sikao [Improving the Security System of Minimum Living Cost for Rural Residents].” Wuhan 
daxue xubao (Zhexue shehuikexue ban) Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy & Social Sciences) 
5(5): 644–648.
174  J. WanG and Y. BaI
Du, Y., and A. Park. 2007. “The Effects of Social Assistance on Poverty Reduction: Evidence from 
Household Surveys in Urban China.” Paper presented at The International Conference on Policy 
Perspectives on Growth, Economic Structures and Poverty Reduction, Beijing, China.
Gao, Q. 2006. “The Social Benefit System in Urban China: Reforms and Trends from 1988 to 2002.” 
Journal of East Asian Studies 6 (1): 31–67. doi:10.1017/s1598240800000035.
Gao, Q. 2010. “Redistributive Nature of the Chinese Social Benefit System: Progressive or Regressive?” 
The China Quarterly 201: 1–19. doi:10.1017/S0305741009991044.
Gao, Q., and F. Zhai. 2012. “Anti-Poverty Family Policies in China: A Critical Evaluation.” Asian Social 
Work and Policy Review 6 (2): 122–135. doi:10.1111/j.1753-1411.2012.00067.x.
Gao, Q., I. Garfinkel, and F. Zhai. 2009. “Anti-Poverty Effectiveness of the Minimum Living Standard 
Assistance Policy in Urban China.” Review of Income and Wealth 55 (s1): 630–655. doi:10.1111/
j.1475-4991.2009.00334.x.
Gustafsson, B. A., and Q. Deng. 2011. “Di Bao Receipt and Its Importance for Combating Poverty in 
Urban China.” Poverty & Public Policy 3 (1): 1–32. doi:10.2202/1944-2858.1127.
Huang, C., D. Wang, S. Qiu, and M. Cai. 2005. “Rang jiuye youliketu – wanshan Shanghai chengshi 
zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu yanjiu [Make Work Pay: A Case Study of Minimum Livelihood 
Guarantee System for Urban Residents in Shanghai].” Shichang yu renkou fenxi [Market and 
Demographic Analysis] 11 (3): 1–9.
Jiang, S. 2013. “Zhongguo dibao zhidu de bianqian fazhan he moshi suzao: 21shiji yilai zhongguo 
chengxiang dibao zhidu de shehui bianqian [The Social Change and the Shaping of Developmental 
Mode for the Minimum Living Security System in China].” Shehui baozhang yanjiu [Social Security 
Studies] 6: 71–79.
Leung, J. C. B. 2003. “Social Security Reforms in China: Issues and Prospects.” International Journal 
of Social Welfare 12 (2): 73–85. doi:10.1111/1468-2397.t01-1-00246.
Leung, J. C. B. 2006. “The Emergence of Social Assistance in China.” International Journal of Social 
Welfare 15 (3): 188–198. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2397.2006.00434.x.
Leung, J. C. B., and H. S. W. Wong. 1999. “The Emergence of a Community-Based Social Assistance 
Programme in Urban China.” Social Policy & Administration 33 (1): 39–54. doi:10.1111/1467-
9515.00130.
Liu, L. 2009. “Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on China: Empirical Evidence and Policy 
Implications.” China & World Economy 17 (6): 1–23. doi:10.1111/j.1749-124X.2009.01171.x.
Meng, X., R. Gregory, and Y. Wang. 2005. “Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Urban China, 1996-
2000.” Journal of Comparative Economics 33 (4): 710–729. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2005.08.006.
Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2014. Zhongguo minzheng tongji nianjian 
2014 [China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014]. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2011. “Minzhengbu, guojia fazhan he gaige 
weiyuanhui guanyu yinfa ‘minzheng shiye fazhan di 12ge wunian guihua’ de tongzhi [Ministry of 
Civil Affairs, the National Development and Reform Commission on the Issurance of the ‘Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan on the Civil Affairs Development’].” Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of China. http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/zwgk/jhgh/201112/20111200248418.shtml
Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2012. “Minzhengbu guanyu yinfa ‘Zuidi 
shenghuo baozhang shenhe shenpi banfa (shixing)’ de tongzhi [Ministry of Civil Affairs Notification 
on Issuing the ‘Way for Check and Approval of the Minimum Living Guarantee Programs (Trial)’].” 
Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/zwgk/
fvfg/zdshbz/201212/20121200394637.shtml
Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2015. “2014nian shehui fuwu fazhan tongji 
gongbao [2014 Social Service Development Statistical Communique].” http://www.mca.gov.cn/
article/sj/tjgb/201506/201506008324399.shtml
National Bureau of Population and Employment Statistics Division. 2004-2013. Zhongguo renkou 
he jiuye tongji nianjian [China Population & Employment Statistics Yearbook]. Beijing: China 
Statistics Press.
National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2004-2013. Zhongguo renkou he jiuye tongji nianjian [China 
Statistical Yearbook]. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
ChIna JournaL of SoCIaL Work  175
Ngok, Ki. 2010. “Social Assistance Policy and Its Impact on Social Development in China: The Case 
of the Minimum Living Standard Scheme (MLSS).” China Journal of Social Work 3 (1): 35–52. 
doi:10.1080/17525090903560606.
Olaskoaga, J., R. Alaez-Aller, and P. Diaz-De-Basurto-Uraga. 2013. “Beyond Welfare Effort in the 
Measuring of Welfare States.” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 15 (3): 
274–287. doi:10.1080/13876988.2013.785148.
Ravallion, M., S. Chen, and Y. Wang. 2006. “Does the Di Bao Program Guarantee a Minimum Income 
in China’s Cities?” Chap.16 in Public Finance in China: Reform and Growth for a Harmonious 
Society, edited by J. Lou, and S. Wang, 317–334. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Ravallion, M., and S. Chen. 2007. “China’s (Uneven) Progress against Poverty.” Journal of Development 
Economics 82 (1): 1–42. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.07.003.
Saunders, P., and L. Sun. 2006. “Poverty and Hardship among the Aged in Urban China.” Social Policy 
& Administration 40 (2): 138–157. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9515.2006.00481.x.
Saunders, P., and X. Shang. 2001. “Social Security Reform in China’s Transition to a Market Economy.” 
Social Policy & Administration 35 (3): 274–289. doi:10.1111/1467-9515.00233.
Shang, X., and X. Wu. 2004. “Changing Approaches of Social Protection: Social Assistance Reform 
in Urban China.” Social Policy and Society 3 (3): 259–271. doi:10.1017/S1474746404001770.
Solinger, D. J. 2005. “Path Dependency Reexamined: Chinese Welfare Policy in the Transition to 
Unemployment.” Comparative Politics 38 (1): 83–101. doi:10.2307/20072914.
Solinger, D. J., and Y. Hu. 2012. “Welfare, Wealth and Poverty in Urban China: The Dibao and its 
Differential Disbursement.” The China Quarterly 211: 714–764. doi:10.1017/S0305741012000835.
State Council of the People’s Republic of China. 1999. “Chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang 
tiaoli [Regulations on Guaranteeing Urban Residents’ Minimum Living Standard].” State Council of 
the People’s Republic of China. http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/gk/fg/shjz/201507/20150700848484.
shtml
Tang, Jun, S. Lin, and Z. Ren. 2003. Zhonguo chengshi pinkun yu fanpinkun baogao [Report on Poverty 
and Anti-Poverty in Urban China]. Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House.
Wang, M. 2007. “Emerging Urban Poverty and Effects of the Dibao Program on Alleviating Poverty 
in China.” China & World Economy 15 (2): 74–88. doi:10.1111/j.1749-124X.2007.00062.x.
Wang, J., and M. Gunderson. 2011. “Minimum Wage Impacts in China: Estimates from a Prespecified 
Research Design, 2000-2007.” Contemporary Economic Policy 29 (3): 392–406. doi:10.1111/j.1465-
7287.2010.00239.x.
Wang, J, and O. van Vliet. 2014. “Social Assistance and Minimum Income Benefits: Benefit Levels, 
Replacement Rates and Policies across 33 Countries, 1990-2009.” Department of Economics Research 
Memorandum 4. Leiden: Leiden University.
Wang, J, and O. van Vliet. forthcoming. “Social Assistance and Minimum Income Benefits: Benefit 
Levels, Replacement Rates and Policies across 26 Countries, 1990-2009.” European Journal of 
Social Security 3.
Wu, A. M., and M. Ramesh. 2014. “Poverty Reduction in Urban China: The Impact of Cash Transfers.” 
Social Policy and Society 13 (2): 285–299. doi:10.1017/S1474746413000626.
Zhang, H. 2012. “Discourse Change and Policy Development in Social Assistance in China.” 
International Journal of Social Welfare 21 (4): 433–442. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2397.2011.00845.x.
Zhang, M. 2009. “The Impact of the Global Crisis on China and Its Reaction.” Análisis 
del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI) 62: 1. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/
connect/7f3587804f018af4aad8ee3170baead1/ARI62-2009_Ming_Global_Crisis_China_Reaction.
pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=7f3587804f018af4aad8ee3170baead1
Zhong, Y. 2011. “Dangdai zhongguo chengshi dibao zhidu de yanjin yu fansi [The Evolution and 
Reflection of Contemporary Chinese Urban Subsistence Security System].” Dangdai zhongguo lishi 
yanjiu [Contemporary China History Studies] 18 (6): 54–62.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ChIna JournaL of SoCIaL Work  177
M
LG
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
(Y
ua
n,
 C
PI
 2
01
3=
10
0)
re
al
 M
LG
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 p
er
 p
er
so
n 
(Y
ua
n,
 C
PI
 2
01
3=
10
0)
20
03
20
08
20
13
Ch
an
ge
 
20
03
-2
00
8
Ch
an
ge
 
20
08
-2
01
3
Ch
an
ge
 
20
03
-2
01
3
20
03
20
08
20
13
Ch
an
ge
 
20
03
-2
00
8
Ch
an
ge
 
20
08
-2
01
3
Ch
an
ge
 
20
03
-2
01
3
Ea
st
h
ai
na
n
19
8.
1
22
0.
3
35
3.
3
22
.2
13
3.
0
15
5.
2
82
.0
13
7.
6
23
7.
1
55
.6
99
.5
15
5.
1
fu
jia
n
22
6.
3
23
6.
5
36
3.
3
10
.2
12
6.
8
13
7.
0
71
.0
14
8.
8
24
0.
4
77
.7
91
.6
16
9.
4
h
eb
ei
20
7.
8
22
1.
1
37
8.
5
13
.3
15
7.
4
17
0.
7
62
.2
15
7.
6
23
1.
9
95
.4
74
.3
16
9.
7
G
ua
ng
do
ng
26
7.
8
28
5.
7
38
0.
4
17
.8
94
.7
11
2.
6
94
.9
16
6.
5
25
3.
6
71
.6
87
.1
15
8.
7
li
ao
ni
ng
22
7.
9
25
5.
0
41
1.
5
27
.1
15
6.
5
18
3.
6
79
.4
15
5.
2
31
2.
7
75
.7
15
7.
5
23
3.
3
Sh
an
do
ng
20
6.
7
26
2.
4
41
7.
7
55
.7
15
5.
3
21
1.
0
62
.5
15
4.
7
28
6.
4
92
.2
13
1.
7
22
3.
9
Jia
ng
su
25
1.
8
31
6.
7
48
5.
1
64
.8
16
8.
4
23
3.
3
10
1.
8
18
6.
1
29
6.
5
84
.3
11
0.
4
19
4.
7
Zh
ej
ia
ng
27
6.
5
33
5.
2
51
5.
5
58
.7
18
0.
3
23
9.
0
14
4.
1
28
2.
7
40
0.
4
13
8.
7
11
7.
7
25
6.
3
Be
iji
ng
36
6.
9
44
3.
3
58
0.
0
76
.3
13
6.
7
21
3.
1
24
2.
9
34
5.
0
51
0.
9
10
2.
0
16
5.
9
26
8.
0
Ti
an
jin
31
7.
5
45
5.
2
60
0.
0
13
7.
8
14
4.
8
28
2.
5
85
.6
36
6.
5
43
3.
4
28
0.
8
66
.9
34
7.
8
Sh
an
gh
ai
37
5.
8
45
4.
4
64
0.
0
78
.7
18
5.
6
26
4.
2
17
3.
6
27
7.
7
50
0.
9
10
4.
0
22
3.
2
32
7.
3
Ce
nt
ra
l
h
en
an
17
3.
7
19
2.
1
30
9.
2
18
.4
11
7.
1
13
5.
5
70
.9
13
6.
4
20
7.
2
65
.5
70
.8
13
6.
3
Jil
in
17
4.
0
18
5.
6
32
2.
5
11
.6
13
6.
9
14
8.
5
70
.9
15
9.
4
32
1.
7
88
.5
16
2.
3
25
0.
8
Sh
an
xi
16
7.
8
22
6.
5
35
1.
1
58
.7
12
4.
6
18
3.
3
75
.8
16
2.
8
24
0.
7
87
.0
77
.9
16
4.
9
h
un
an
18
8.
6
20
5.
1
35
6.
1
16
.5
15
1.
0
16
7.
5
64
.2
15
3.
7
24
4.
4
89
.5
90
.7
18
0.
2
h
ub
ei
18
7.
2
21
3.
4
37
5.
1
26
.2
16
1.
7
18
7.
9
73
.8
16
2.
1
24
6.
6
88
.3
84
.5
17
2.
8
an
hu
i
20
7.
7
23
8.
7
38
0.
5
31
.0
14
1.
8
17
2.
8
68
.3
14
9.
3
27
1.
5
81
.0
12
2.
2
20
3.
2
h
ei
lo
ng
Jia
ng
20
2.
2
23
0.
7
38
7.
7
28
.4
15
7.
0
18
5.
5
64
.7
15
9.
6
29
0.
3
94
.8
13
0.
7
22
5.
6
Jia
ng
xi
14
8.
0
21
8.
3
39
5.
7
70
.4
17
7.
4
24
7.
7
72
.7
16
5.
6
22
6.
5
92
.9
60
.9
15
3.
8
W
es
t
G
an
su
17
7.
9
18
5.
1
27
9.
0
7.
3
93
.9
10
1.
1
80
.6
17
7.
1
26
8.
9
96
.5
91
.8
18
8.
3
n
in
gx
ia
21
5.
4
21
7.
4
28
7.
6
2.
0
70
.2
72
.2
99
.9
15
8.
9
20
2.
5
59
.0
43
.6
10
2.
6
Xi
nj
ia
ng
17
7.
9
16
8.
1
30
0.
4
−
9.
8
13
2.
3
12
2.
5
94
.4
16
7.
9
26
6.
7
73
.4
98
.8
17
2.
3
Si
ch
ua
n
18
8.
4
21
9.
5
30
6.
4
31
.1
86
.9
11
8.
0
69
.8
14
2.
8
20
6.
9
73
.0
64
.1
13
7.
1
Yu
nn
an
21
7.
2
23
0.
2
32
3.
9
13
.0
93
.7
10
6.
7
88
.6
16
3.
9
22
4.
2
75
.3
60
.3
13
5.
6
Q
in
gh
ai
22
4.
8
23
2.
0
33
0.
8
7.
2
98
.8
10
6.
0
10
6.
5
22
0.
7
26
7.
9
11
4.
2
47
.2
16
1.
4
G
ua
ng
xi
18
8.
9
20
0.
0
33
4.
7
11
.2
13
4.
7
14
5.
8
76
.4
13
8.
3
22
8.
3
62
.0
90
.0
15
1.
9
Ch
on
gq
in
g
19
7.
3
26
0.
5
34
6.
8
63
.2
86
.3
14
9.
5
98
.7
16
3.
9
25
7.
9
65
.3
94
.0
15
9.
2
G
ui
zh
ou
14
7.
8
17
9.
1
34
7.
6
31
.3
16
8.
5
19
9.
8
70
.5
15
3.
4
24
5.
9
82
.9
92
.5
17
5.
4
Sh
aa
nx
i
18
5.
0
19
9.
2
37
4.
7
14
.2
17
5.
5
18
9.
7
68
.5
17
4.
8
30
8.
3
10
6.
3
13
3.
5
23
9.
8
Ti
be
t
22
8.
3
29
9.
3
43
2.
4
71
.1
13
3.
1
20
4.
1
11
0.
1
16
6.
2
38
4.
4
56
.1
21
8.
2
27
4.
3
in
ne
r M
on
go
lia
17
1.
1
22
5.
7
46
0.
3
54
.5
23
4.
6
28
9.
2
71
.4
19
8.
8
36
7.
5
12
7.
4
16
8.
7
29
6.
1
M
ea
n-
n
at
io
na
l
21
5.
9
25
2.
0
39
1.
2
36
.1
13
9.
2
17
5.
3
90
.2
18
2.
4
28
9.
8
92
.2
10
7.
4
19
9.
5
M
ea
n-
Ea
st
26
5.
7
31
6.
9
46
5.
9
51
.1
14
9.
1
20
0.
2
10
9.
1
21
6.
2
33
6.
7
10
7.
1
12
0.
5
22
7.
6
M
ea
n-
Ce
nt
ra
l
18
1.
1
21
3.
8
35
9.
7
32
.7
14
5.
9
17
8.
6
70
.2
15
6.
1
25
6.
1
86
.0
10
0.
0
18
5.
9
M
ea
n-
W
es
t
19
3.
3
21
8.
0
34
3.
7
24
.7
12
5.
7
15
0.
4
86
.3
16
8.
9
26
9.
1
82
.6
10
0.
2
18
2.
8
Ap
pe
nd
ix
 2
. T
re
nd
s i
n 
re
al
 m
on
th
ly
 M
lG
 st
an
da
rd
 a
nd
 M
lG
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 p
er
 p
er
so
n 
ac
ro
ss
 re
gi
on
s, 
20
03
–2
01
3.
n
ot
e:
 T
he
 n
at
io
na
l M
lG
 st
an
da
rd
 a
nd
 n
at
io
na
l r
ea
l M
lG
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 a
re
 th
e 
si
m
pl
e 
av
er
ag
es
 o
f t
he
 3
1 
re
gi
on
s.
So
ur
ce
: C
hi
na
 C
iv
il 
aff
ai
rs
’ S
ta
tis
tic
al
 Y
ea
rb
oo
k 
20
14
, n
at
io
na
l B
ur
ea
u 
of
 S
ta
tis
tic
s o
f C
hi
na
 (h
tt
p:
//
da
ta
.s
ta
ts
.g
ov
.c
n/
w
or
ks
pa
ce
/in
de
x?
m
=
hg
jd
/)
 a
nd
 o
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
.
